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Summary 
Foreign direct investment may improve productivity through technology 
transfer on the one hand, and it may also have other positive external effects through 
corporate linkages (e.g. market access, or improved terms of financing) on the other 
hand, thus promoting economic growth.  These beneficial effects are not automatic, 
though. Until the mid-nineties Hungary had played a leading role within the region 
in attracting investments.  After 1999, however, the country started accumulating 
increasing competitive disadvantages as compared to its competitors.  Even though 
stock data adjusted for reinvested profits show less of a lag, the post-1999 figures still 
indicate a gradual deterioration. 
The positive economic effects of the foreign investments already in Hungary 
have also fallen short of expectations.  The most important positive impacts 
comprised the competition from firms with foreign owners and the restructuring of 
the economy.  However, foreign-owned companies have established few linkages 
with Hungarian economic actors, even though the number of such links has been 
increasing. 
In order to improve our capacity to attract capital it would be important to 
improve the general investment environment by eliminating macro-economic 
imbalances and by developing infrastructure as well as education and training.  The 
treatment of the corporate income tax as an incentive to attract investment and the 
reduction of other taxes, contributions and local taxes would also be worth 
considering.  The institution system of investment promotion would also require 
considerable changes: a single, more independent, more proactive organisation 
would be needed with decision making powers and concentrating exclusively on 
investment promotion.  That institution must have a co-ordination role in granting 
benefits. 
Following our EU accession, the emphasis may be shifted to financial 
incentives, with fiscal incentives diminishing in significance – while, because of the 
EU regulations, the differences in investment promotion between Hungary and its 
main competitors will become smaller, and the regional incentive competition will 
lose some of its intensity.  The system of investment incentives should be redesigned 
in order to use arrangements allowed and cofinanced under the EU rules.  At the 
same time we must keep in mind that the EU places emphasis on compliance with 
the aid ceiling rather than on the form of assistance. 
The positive impacts of foreign direct investment on the host economy and its 
integration into the host economy is at least as important as the attraction of new 
investments, though these former are more difficult to influence with economic 
policy instruments. 
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Introduction 
The influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the Hungarian economy 
started in the late nineties.  On the whole, Hungarian economic policy has 
maintained a system of regulations and allowances favourable to investments all the 
way through.  Though there is general agreement among Hungarian scholars that 
investment promotion plays no part in attracting capital, this paper sets out to prove, 
primarily through international examples, that as target areas for investment are 
becoming increasingly similar on a regional and global scale alike, the role of various 
incentives and regulatory instruments will in all probability become more important. 
Undertakings with foreign ownership have played a decisive role in the 
performance of the Hungarian economy, primarily after the second half of the 
nineties.  For a long time Hungary was the leading country in the region in terms of 
the inward investment, but starting in 2000, statistics indicated a significant drop in 
the volume of capital inflows.  Hungary’s ability to attract capital has declined both 
in absolute terms (as compared to the flows of previous years) and in relative terms 
(compared to our key competitors).  Though FDI already in Hungary have 
considerably “catalysed”, accelerated transition, they did not live up to the 
expectations for instance in respect of the use of domestic suppliers.  In that situation 
the role of economic policy becomes more important in attracting capital and 
reversing the adverse trends, especially in two areas:  one important objective is to 
increase the annual inflow, the other one is to more fully exploit the beneficial effects 
on the host economy. 
1.  Why is FDI good for the economy? 
For a country, the relationship of FDI and competitiveness is best conveyed 
through the impact of foreign direct investment on economic growth.  Theory does 
not provide a definitive answer to the question whether the inflow of capital is 
beneficial for an economy. 
According to the neoclassical growth theory model, foreign direct investment 
does not affect the long term growth rate.  This is understandable if we consider the 
assumptions of the model, namely:  constant economies of scale, decreasing marginal 
products of inputs, positive substitution elasticity of inputs and perfect competition.  
The exogenous increase of FDI increases the amount of capital per capita, but due to 
the assumptions this can only be transitional, as the declining returns on the capital 
put a constraint on that growth.  FDI may influence the long term growth rate 
through its impact on two exogenous factors:  one is technological development, the 
other one is the change in the amount of labour employed.  That is, the effect of 
(foreign direct) investment can be positive on growth only if it raises the level of 
technology and of employment in the country. 
The endogenous growth theory, which dispenses with the assumption of 
perfect competition, leaves more scope for the impact of FDI on growth.  In this 
theoretical framework investment, including FDI, affects the rate of growth through 
research and development (R&D) or through its impact on human capital.  Even if 
the return on investment is declining, FDI may influence growth through 
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externalities.  These may include the knowledge “leaking” into the local economy 
through the subsidiary (organisation forms, improvement of human capital, 
improvement of fixed assets), as well as effects through the various contacts of the 
subsidiary with local companies (joint ventures, technical-technological links, 
technology transfer, orders, sale of intermediate products, market access, improved 
financing conditions, more intense competition generated by the presence of the 
subsidiaries, etc.).  These factors increase the productivity of the subsidiary and of 
the connecting companies in the host economy.  Technology transfer and the local 
ripple effects prevent the decline of the marginal productivity of capital, thus 
facilitating longer term higher growth rates induced by endogenous factors.  Thus 
the existence of such externalities is one of the preconditions of the positive effect of 
FDI on the host economy. 
From the aspect of companies, the most important actors are the multinational 
companies implementing the FDI.  Such companies carry out the most R&D 
activities.  Consequently, they are the most important sources of technology transfer.  
(In our broad interpretation, technology also includes organisation and management 
skills).  The host economy may receive such technologies directly from the local 
subsidiaries of multinational companies, or indirectly through transactions between 
the subsidiary and other firms of the host economy.  The impact of the technology 
transfer may be manifested in improved productivity, the transformation of the 
industry structure, the increase of R&D expenditures, the change of the export (and 
import) structure, or the change of the human capital base.  However, the presence of 
FDI does not guarantee a technology transfer with positive impacts on economic 
growth.  Perhaps inappropriate technology is transferred (e.g. as compared to the 
level of the human capital), or no significant technology transfer occurs, technology 
does not spread (e.g. due to institutional deficiencies, the lack of receptiveness of the 
local economy or the isolation of the subsidiary). 
The various theoretical schools attribute different impacts to foreign direct 
investment on economic growth.  Consequently, the few empirical studies focusing 
specifically on the role of FDI in growth yield controversial results.  In a number of 
cases, studies covering several countries did not find a significant/positive 
correlation between economic growth and FDI (e.g. de Mello (1999), Crankovic and 
Levin (2000), Lipsey (2000)).  One of the most important “counter-examples” is the 
analysis of Borenstein, de Gregorio and Lee (1998), which proves that FDI may have 
a positive impact on economic growth depending on the level of human capital and 
the capital absorption capacity in the host country.  If the quality of human capital 
exceeds a threshold (which is measured by the ratio of persons participating in 
secondary education), foreign direct investments may significantly increase the rate 
of growth.  Hermes and Lensink (2000) came to a similar conclusion, when looking at 
developing countries they found that not only human capital but also financial 
markets must reach a certain level of development.  The role of financial markets in 
this respect is also emphasised by Alfaro, Chanda, Ozcan and Sayek (2001).1  In the 
case of transition countries between 1990 and 1998, Campos and Kinoshita (2002) 
                                                 
1 Another positive example: According to Xu (2000), FDI promotes the growth of the total factor 
productivity (TFP). 
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found that FDI had a positive and significant impact on economic growth.  They 
thought to reinforce the findings of Borenstein, de Gregorio and Lee (1998), 
emphasizing that in transition countries the quality of human capital is above the 
threshold required for the positive impacts of FDI on economic growth to 
materialise. 
 
Methodological issues 
The most reliable figures concerning foreign direct investment are derived from the 
balance of payments, and that is also the most widely used source of data in international 
studies and comparisons.  However, the balance of payments does not have the objective of 
disclosing the actual influx of direct investment into the economy concerned.  The balance of 
payments fundamentally aims to register cash and capital movements between residents and 
non-residents of the country.  This is why foreign direct investments include items that 
should not be considered as such from the aspect of industrial economics, such as short term 
intra-company loans, including commercial loans. 
There is also another problem relating to the comparability of data disclosed in the balance 
of payments.  The standardisation of those data is ongoing under the auspices of international 
organisations (the IMF and the OECD).  Not every country discloses data in compliance with 
the so-called benchmark definition2 devised by the two organisations.  The figures of the most 
developed transition countries, with the exception of Hungary, complied with the 
requirements of the definition by the late nineties.  In case of Hungary, the FDI figure still 
does not contain reinvested profits 3 .  Consequently, the annual inflow is significantly 
underestimated because, unlike its key competitors, the country is in the phase of FDI inflow 
where reinvested profits are estimated to constitute the most significant component of the 
annual flow, contributing as much as half of the total flow in certain years.  (Antalóczy, Sass, 
2000). 
2.  The role of the state in attracting capital 
Why do companies invest abroad?  Dunning (1993) developed his theory by 
synthesizing the previously published theories, because existing explanations could 
not fully justify the existence of foreign direct investment.  According to Dunning, 
international production is the result of a process affected by ownership, 
internalisation and localisation advantages.  For our purposes the last one is the most 
important:  the factors based on which an investor selects a location for a project.  
These include the factors affecting the availability of local inputs such as natural 
                                                 
2 Figures must comply with the so-called 10% rule (that is, an inward flow is considered FDI if the 
ownership holding exceeds 10%, below that threshold it is portfolio investment, irrespective of the 
form of the flow), and it must contain the following three components: equity investments, reinvested 
profit and intra-company loan transactions. 
3 According to plans, 2004 will be the first year when the NBH discloses “full” FDI data.  Hungary is 
not the only country to have this problem.  It is enough to look through the IMF statistics to realise 
that reporting is insufficient in case of some EU Member States as well.  This is reinforced by Feenstra 
(1998) who states that the FDI statistics of a number of countries contain no reinvested profits (e.g. 
Japan), and this is probably one of the reasons for the discrepancy in the global inward and outward 
FDI figures. 
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resources, the size of the market, geographical location, the position of the economy, 
the cultural and political environment, factor prices, transport costs, certain elements 
of the economic policy of the government (trade policy, industrial policy, budget 
policy, tax policy etc.).  In other words, the economic policy of the government may 
influence the ability of a country to attract capital. 
Having realised the potential positive impacts of FDI on the economy and on 
competitiveness, governments in recent years have considerably lowered barriers to 
investment, opening up more and more sectors to foreign direct investment 
(UNCTAD, 2002).  Furthermore, a number of countries have tried to improve the 
general investment environment and introduced various incentives to (foreign) 
investors.  These governments could have been motivated in part by macro-economic 
problems (for instance the need to reduce the high debt, to increase the low growth 
rate or to reduce unemployment). 
On the other hand, and more importantly, the processes of globalisation and 
regionalisation have created a new situation where the role of investment incentives 
has become more important in the eyes of governments (Blomström, Kokko, 2003).  
As a result of international (GATT, WTO) and regional (e.g. EU, NAFTA) trade 
liberalisation, the standardisation of regulations and unilateral liberalisation 
measures as well as technical-technological innovation and the advance of 
telecommunication, markets have become increasingly integrated, and the size of the 
market has been devalued as a factor in selecting the location of investment projects.  
Thus investments producing for exports have gained in significance, and the chances 
of smaller countries have improved to attract investments.  On the other hand, 
national economic policies have fewer and fewer instruments due to the processes of 
globalisation/regionalisation, therefore the “remaining instruments”, including FDI 
promotion tools, will become much more important. 
Thirdly, the emphasis on attracting investment has resulted in a kind of 
“incentive competition” among countries (Oman, 2000), and the ability of countries 
not entering that competition to attract capital may be seriously compromised.  The 
intensification of the “incentive competition” is indicated by the increase of 
government subsidies per job created by FDI.  According to the figures of UNCTAD 
(2002, p. 205), this value was often above USD 100,000, for instance in 2000 in case of 
the investment of Intel in Israel or of Honda in the US.  From among EU Member 
States, Germany (Dow-project, USD 3,400,000/job) and the United Kingdom (Ford-, 
Dupont-, Hyundai-projects) are among the most generous providers of assistance.  
(That generosity with aid raises the question whether in such cases the investor is the 
absolute winner in the competition between countries.  Haaland and Wooton (1993) 
propose that the level of subsidies may be so high that the foreign investor may be 
the net beneficiary even if significant spillovers exist in the host economy.) 
The progress of globalisation/regionalisation has yet another important 
consequence concerning the investment incentive competition: as the integration of 
markets has advanced further on regional than on global level, competition is likely 
to arise between areas within regions covering more than one countries or between 
regions within a large country.  This is because those regions offer similar conditions, 
and incentives may have greater weight in the choice between them. 
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It is questionable how much the site selection decision of investors can be 
influenced by the tools of FDI promotion.  According to the literature, the general 
state of the host economy is the most important consideration in the site selection 
decisions of multinational companies.  Depending on the type of investment 
(whether it produces for the domestic market or exports, and the production factor it 
will most intensively use in the host economy), they look at, for example, the size of 
the market, the income levels, the characteristics of human capital (qualifications, 
productivity, relative wages), the infrastructure system, political and economic 
stability, regulatory and economic policy framework.  The type of the investment 
determines the weight of each factor.  This has been underpinned by the empirical 
literature looking at the capital flows between countries, because for a long time 
researches insisted that benefits and incentives played no part in the site selection 
decisions. 
Empirical findings 
The empirical studies published in the seventies and eighties did not confirm 
the role of investment incentives in the choice between locations offering similar 
conditions either.4  Indeed, in this period the role of benefits could not have been 
central. 
According to more recent empirical findings, in line with what has been said 
about the consequences of globalisation/regionalisation, the location of investment 
projects may also be affected by the various incentives offered by governments.  
According to empirical studies, the impact of allowances was small in the nineties.  
The studies published in this period state that benefits have an impact on the site 
selection decision, but that impact is not decisive.  Incentives in the narrow sense 
play a greater part in the competition of sites within the region concerned (whether 
encompassing several countries, or within a single country), which are similar in 
terms of their other characteristics.  According to the study of Blomström, Kokko, 
Zejan (2000) examining data from several countries in the nineties, the international 
distribution of FDI is determined by market characteristics, relative production costs 
and the availability of production factors.  Incentives have only a limited effect on 
FDI flows.  Christodoulou (1996) proves the critical importance of incentives where 
two-three shortlisted sites “tie”. 
                                                 
4 We should note, however, that important methodological problems were encountered during the 
examination of the role of benefits.  Most importantly, the studies using econometric methods 
generally limited incentives to easily quantifiable tax concessions.  However, even if more complex 
incentive indicators are used, a country offering significant benefits in international comparison may 
attract barely any capital if, for instance, its similarly positioned neighbour offers even greater 
advantages.  Or else, a country with poor real economic indicators may offer relatively sizable benefits 
and still attract little investment. 
The problem with questionnaire-interview based surveys is that they generally simply accept investor 
responses that their investment decision was not affected by the nature and range of incentives 
available.  (It is important to note that investors effectively have a disincentive against admitting that 
incentives matter.  On the one hand, this would cast doubt on their long term commitment to the 
area/city/country concerned, and on the other hand, they may feel that it would be inappropriate for 
a wealthy company to worry about the few million dollars that the incentives mean.) 
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However, the most recent studies published after 2000 point out that as a 
result of the advancement of information technology, telecommunication, other 
techniques and technologies and the progress of globalisation the various locations 
are becoming increasingly alike, and in that situation the incentives and benefits are 
becoming increasing important.  (See e.g. studies of Hassett and Hubbard (1997), 
Clark (2000), or Taylor (2000), which empirically present the significance of (tax) 
incentives).  The direction of the change is indicated by Altshuler, Grubert and 
Newlon (1998) as well, who state that tax elasticity of FDI – FDI increment as a 
function of tax benefit – almost doubled between 1984 and 1992.  In some 
questionnaire surveys managers of multinational companies have admitted that 
incentives play an increasing part in their site selection decisions (Easson, 2001).5
Few empirical studies have examined the role of incentives in central-eastern 
European countries.  Findings are controversial, but taking into consideration 
methodological problems and ‘psychological’ motives of investors it appears likely 
that incentives play a growing role in attracting investments in the (former) 
transition countries as well.  According to the findings of Lankes and Venables 
(1997), incentives had no major role in the site selection of foreign direct investments 
in the region.  Éltető and Sass (1998) reached a similar conclusion from the 
examination of investors in Hungary.  (It should be noted that both studies relied on 
a questionnaire technique.  It is a general experience that responses given to 
questionnaires are often not the same as the ones received during (in-depth) 
interviews.)  The OECD (1995) survey on the first half of the nineties relied on 
interviews; tax advisors, government fiscal policy experts and executives of private 
businesses in transition countries were asked about the role of incentives in 
investment decisions.  According to the responses, the primary consideration in these 
decisions is the economic and institutional background and characteristics of the 
potential host countries.  The assessment of incentives comes after that.  If two 
locations are ranked the same based on the other considerations, that is, the general 
condition of the economy and institutions, the availability of infrastructure, 
incentives may tip the balance between them.  Case studies relying on interviews and 
questionnaire surveys (e.g. Antalóczy, 1997 and Antalóczy, Sass, 20036) reveal that 
investments project of outstanding magnitude received generous government 
assistance in Hungary in the early nineties, and these played a decisive role in the 
decision of the investor to choose Hungary from among the countries of the region.  
Mah and Tamulaitis (2000, pp.236-237) cite similar cases from Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. 
The effectiveness of incentives 
It is also important how effective the incentives are from the point of view of 
the country offering them.  Effectiveness can be interpreted in one of two ways:  
                                                 
5 For the sake of completeness it should be noted that some of the most recent surveys conclude that 
tax benefits play no major role.  E.g. Wunder (2001) analysed on a panel of 75 firms selected from the 
Fortune 500 list the most important factors in site selection decisions.  According to their findings, the 
tax factors were decisive for only 4 companies. 
6 The reason why the companies “confessed” in the questionnaires that incentives mattered was that 
the survey was conducted in a “historic moment”, when companies felt it was important that they 
take a stand on the issue of incentives because of the accession negotiations. 
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firstly, whether they help attract investments in general.  As seen above, the answer 
to this is increasingly affirmative.  More generous incentives may redirect 
investments among countries in similar positions. 
For the other interpretation of effectiveness we must examine whether the 
costs of the incentives are compensated for, or exceeded, by the positive impacts 
exerted by the investment in the host economy, if any.  One of the reasons for the 
introduction of incentives may be that the foreign investor is unable to internalise 
some of the externalities mentioned, therefore the private and social rate of return are 
different from each other.  Thus the use of FDI-incentives can be justified along the 
lines that as long as their costs do not exceed the difference of social and private 
returns, they are beneficial for the host economy.7  In economic literature the analysis 
of intra-industry and inter-industry spillovers, and of the relationship of FDI and 
economic growth attempts to find out whether the social benefit exceeds the cost of 
the incentives.  As seen under the analysis of the relationship of FDI and growth, the 
findings are controversial.  The same applies to the examination of spillovers8.  For 
instance, looking at the effects of FDI attracted by tax incentives on R&D, Hall and 
Van Reenen (2000) and Bloom, Griffith, Van Reenen (2000) found a positive 
correlation.  Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) report positive spillovers, Aitken and 
Harrison (1999) negative ones.  Konings (1999) found examples of negative spillovers 
in the transition countries, at least in the early nineties.  According to Blomström, 
Kokko and Zejan (2000), the characteristics of the host country and of the sector 
determine the effect of FDI on the economy.  All this reveals that positive spillovers, 
representing the positive effects of FDI, are possible, but they are not automatically 
manifested.  Blomström et. al. conclude from case studies that the materialisation of 
potential spillovers depends on the ability of local firms to receive them.  Their study 
concluded that forward linkages generally result in positive spillovers, while this is 
less so in case of backward linkages.  Spillovers among industries may be stronger 
than those within industries. 
Government incentives in practice 
Which incentives-benefits do government use to attract capital?  Those 
elements of the economic policy may be mentioned here that have the purpose of 
improving payback of investments (in particular FDI), or reducing their costs and/or 
risk.  Incentives may be fiscal, financial or other.  These incentives influence mostly 
the site selection for new investments (as well capacity expansion); capital flows 
relating to mergers and acquisitions are hardly affected by the incentive system. 
According to the literature, FDI incentives in the narrow sense include fiscal, 
financial and other incentives. In many cases governments attach various conditions 
and performance requirements (PR) to the incentives to assure that FDI “delivers” 
                                                 
7 It should also be noted that incentives have potential negative effects on the host country as well.  
The most important such effects include the reduced tax base, the distortion of resource allocation, 
corruption and the strengthening of rent-seeking.  (Zee, Stotsky, Ley, 2002, p. 1498) 
8 In many cases the analysis of the relationship of FDI and growth on the one hand, and FDI and the 
spillovers on the other, are lumped together.  Even though FDI may have an indirect effect on growth 
also through spillovers, in this paper we still discuss the literature of the two types of analysis 
separately. 
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the expected positive impacts with greater probability, and also to direct investments 
into strategic sectors, activities or regions for industrial policy considerations.9  Such 
PR’s may include: local added value requirement, export requirement, minimum 
investment requirement, the requirement of domestic participation, employment-
related requirements, technology transfer requirement, R&D requirement etc.  
Multilateral (GATT, WTO) and regional conventions impose considerable restriction 
of the applicability of PR.10
 
Table 1 Key FDI incentives in the narrow sense 
Type of incentive Purpose Elements 
fiscal to reduce the tax burden on the 
investor 
tax credit, tax relief, tax rebate, exemption 
from customs duty, reduction of tax base, 
VAT exemption, accelerated depreciation, 
reinvestment allowance, loss accrual 
financial to provide direct financial assistance Soft loans, grants, sovereign guarantee on 
investment credits, export guarantee, 
insurance and credit, subsidised funding 
for various purposes 
Other to increase the profitability/reduce 
the costs of the investment through 
non-financial means 
preferential government contracts, real 
estate provided below market price, 
promotion of institutional investment, 
SME development programmes, customs 
free areas, special economic zones, 
industrial parks 
Source:  compiled by the author 
 
When examining the motivations of investors we saw that in addition to, and 
even before, incentives in the narrow sense they consider the quality of the 
investment environment, the operating conditions and payoff of the investments, the 
characteristics of the real economy when selecting the site of an investment.  From 
the aspect of the government the various macro-economic policies play a part in the 
formation of those factors.  (Antalóczy, Sass, 2003).  They may be described by 
quantifiable indicators and non-quantifiable criteria.  The former category includes 
for instance GDP per capita, GDP growth, the inflation rate, current account balance 
and budget balance to GDP, the unemployment rate, as well as indicators of 
infrastructure availability, the competitiveness of labour, the investment climate and 
                                                 
9 PR’s are used both in developed and in developing countries (Safarian, 2002).  Their efficiency in 
directing FDI and assuring its positive effects is not clear.  Some case studies report instances where 
PR was used successfully. (Cited by Kumar (2002) and Balasumbranyam (2002)) 
10 The WTO conventions on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCMs) and on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs) prohibit the use of certain PR’s while allowing other, non-PR-related 
incentives.  (The local added value requirement, the “trade equalisation” requirement and export 
control are not allowed.  Some of these have been replaced by trade policy measures, e.g. rules on 
origin.)  NAFTA and EU are regional integrations where incentive policies have been aligned to some 
extent. 
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the size of the market.  The latter category comprises, inter alia, the quality of the 
banking system, the status of privatisation, its techniques, the characteristics of trade 
and competition policy, public security, corruption, cultural similarity, and the 
quality of life – the quality of residence and the environment, cultural facilities, 
quality of schools (and within that, availability of education in foreign languages), 
and even the quality of hotels and catering facilities. 
From among the macro-economic policies that affect the general investment 
climate, most important ones are the monetary and fiscal policies.  These influence 
the indicators of economic stability (inflation, external and budget equilibrium), and 
interest rates, and through that, the cost of capital, investment decisions and the type 
of investments.  (Naturally, this effect is much weaker in case of foreign investors 
because, unlike Hungarian investors, they have much more financing sources 
available.)  The fiscal policy determines the general taxation level, and within that, 
the corporate income tax rate.  (According to empirical studies, if all other factors 
influencing FDI are equal in two countries, the one with lower income tax rates 
attracts more direct investment.11)  Within monetary policy, exchange rate policy may 
be a measure of stability.  It affects the relative prices of the securities of the host 
country, the relative size of the repatriated profit and, in case of export-oriented 
investments, the competitiveness of the exported products. 
As to other economic policy areas:  structural policies affect the industry 
structure, its spatial location, the position of R&D, and the composition of economic 
actors.  The policies regulating the various factor markets, such as labour market 
policy, have an indirect effect on the attractiveness of the country for foreign 
investors.  Similarly, the policies influencing the quality of labour, primarily 
education policy but also health policy, may have indirect effects.  Privatisation 
policy may be an important instrument to attract foreign direct investments, as long 
as the potential buyers are not discriminated based on their nationality when selling 
state-owned companies, utilities etc., that is, unless domestic buyers are given 
preferential treatment.  Major privatisation transactions or sale of concession rights 
themselves may determine the sectoral composition of inward FDI in the given year.  
Furthermore, privatisation contracts may contain provisions which otherwise belong 
to the jurisdiction of other economic policy elements, such as the employment 
obligation of the privatised company, the specification of export sales or output 
levels for a certain period.  There may be entry and exit regulation that are applicable 
only to foreign direct investments.  Entry regulations include the ceiling of foreign 
ownership (100 percent, majority or minority foreign holding) and the list of sectors 
where foreign direct investment is allowed (or prohibited).  Even though exit 
regulations were widely used in the sixties and seventies, primarily in developing 
countries, they are now present in very few regulatory systems.  Competition policy 
                                                 
11 The importance of general income taxation is underlined by several studies.  De Mooij and Ederveen 
(2001) review, and recalculate with comparable data, the findings of 15 empirical studies.  According 
to the authors, a 1% reduction in the tax rate of the host country increases the inward FDI flow by 
3.3%.  (Studies using the effective tax rate arrive at an even higher elasticity value).  According to 
Desai, Foley, Hines (2002), the value of FDI originating in the US is 5% lower in countries with 10% 
higher tax rates, and the tax effect is especially strong in Europe.  (Naturally the correlation is changed 
if the investor is offered different tax allowances in the countries examined.) 
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may affect the inflow of foreign direct investment through controlling mergers and 
acquisitions.  From another aspect, competition policy and the relevant enforcement 
authority affect the operating environment of companies with foreign participation 
through the regulations and decisions affecting the market structure and competition 
and actions against antitrust violations and restrictive practices.  Trade policy 
determines the market access of exported products, the availability and cost price of 
imported inputs.  The importance of this is different for export-oriented companies 
and for firms producing for the domestic market, but one aspect or the other is 
generally important for every investor.  Closed markets in themselves may be 
attractive to FDI, as they induce companies to create production capacities in the 
country concerned instead of the costly, and sometimes impracticable, exportation.12
As we have seen, the positive effects of FDI on the host economy are 
guaranteed by the fullest possible attainment of the potential spillovers.  The 
spillover effects can be increased by the remaining allowed PRs and the policies 
improving the absorption capacity of local firms and their ability to learn from the 
foreign company.  These include the ones which improve the possibilities of 
spillovers substantially ex ante, and are also compatible with regional and 
multilateral conventions, such as assistance to education, training, R&D.  Other 
policies, such as infrastructure development, also promote the attainment of 
spillovers indirectly. 
In summary, empirical studies reveal about the relationship of broader and 
narrower FDI regulations that capital flow itself is determined by the factors 
influencing FDI in the broad sense.  The size of the market, its growth rate, the 
production costs, the level of qualifications, political and economic stability, the 
regulatory framework and the economic policies indirectly affecting FDI are the most 
important considerations in attracting investments.  The role of incentives is 
important mostly when making a choice between areas similar in the aforesaid 
respects.  That is, specific incentives may direct investments regionally, between two 
similar countries, or within a single country. 
3.  Hungary’s performance –international comparison.  Do investment 
incentives play a role? 
In case of Hungary, the absence of reinvested profit data renders comparison 
difficult.  (Poland has been publishing “full” FDI data since 1994, Slovakia since 1996, 
the Czech Republic since 1998, and because of the questionnaire stock taking method 
it is probable that the stock figures are realistic in case of these countries.)  The effects 
of the absence of reinvested profits are aggravated by the fact that Hungary is in a 
later stage of capital attraction than its competitors.  Thus in case of Hungary 
privatisation related inflow has been modest since the late nineties, while in the 
competing countries of the region as much as half of the total inflow in a year may 
come from such FDI13.  (E.g. last year in the Czech Republic approximately half of the 
                                                 
12 tariff-jumping FDI. 
13 In official statistics only that part of the FDI is recorded as being related to privatisation which is 
collected by the designated state privatisation agency or organisation, and not the investment going to 
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annual inflow consisted in FDI relating to the Transgas privatisation).  At the same 
time, in all probability reinvested profit, which is not included in the statistics, is one 
of the most important components of the annual inflow in Hungary. 
Despite these two problems, the data in Table 2 reveal that Hungary has been 
increasingly lagging behind in the regional competition for FDI since 1999.  In 2002 
even Slovakia, the poorest performer of the region in this respect, “overtook” 
Hungary – mostly as a result of a few privatisation transactions.  The figures of the 
first months of 2003 indicate the strengthening of this trend:  the close to 200 million 
USD negative Hungarian figure contrasts with the continued growth in the other 
countries examined. 
Table 2 Inward foreign direct investment, USD million 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Czech Republic 2,035 2,136 3,700 6,313 4,583 4,916 8,000** 
Poland 4,498 4,908 6,365 7,270 9,342 8,000 6,000 
Hungary 2,275 2,173 2,037 1,944 1,643 2,688 855 
Hungary* 3,364 3,737 3,777 3,846 3,692 (4,443) (2,000) 
Slovakia 351 174 562 354 2,052 1,475 3,500 
* Figure adjusted based on the National Accounts: for 2001, we assumed 
reinvestment volume similar to that in 2000, while for 2002, due to the increase in 
profit repatriation, an amount  of USD 1000 million, comparable to the lowest value 
in the time series.  ** Estimate.  Source:  WIIW/WIFO database, and: Czech Republic 
2002: Czech National Bank; Hungary 2002: NBH euro data converted into USD, 
Ireland: IMF 
 
According to the per capita stock data of end-2002, Hungary is still the leading 
“investment target” in the region, while the continuation of the trends revealed in 
Table 2 may soon result in the loss of that position.  Kalotay (2003) warns of similar 
tendencies after examining the trend of Hungarian participation in the total FDI 
inflow into the region. 
Table 3 Stock of foreign direct investment, USD million 
 FDI stock 
(2001) 
Adjustments 
(1996-2002) 
2002 inflow 
(estimate) 
Adjusted 
stock 
Adjusted 
stock/capita 
(USD) 
Czech 
Republic 
26,764 - 8,000 34,764 3408.0 
Poland 39,000* - 6,000 45,000 1163.4 
Hungary 23,562 +11,270** 855 35,687 3533.3 
Slovakia 6,000* - 3,500 9,500 1756.0 
                                                                                                                                                        
the privatised company as capital increase, for instance.  Consequently the share of privatisation 
related FDI may be higher than the official figures indicate in each country. 
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*estimate.  ** for 2001, we assumed reinvestment volume similar to that in 2000, 
while for 2002, due to the increase in profit repatriation, an amount of USD 1000 
million, comparable to the lowest value in the time series. Source:  see Table 2 
Is the structure of Hungarian investments different in regional comparison?  
As to the structure of investments, similar to the other countries, the most important 
investors are EU Member States (and within that, Germany) with over 80%.  (In this 
respect Poland is an exception, where the EU share is only around 70% because of the 
US investments and the smaller German presence).  Smaller investments may also be 
motivated by geographical proximity (For instance, the large share of Austrian 
investments with the exception of Poland, or Swedish investments in Poland).  
Unlike in Hungary, in the other countries the mix of investors and sectors was less 
stable even in the early 2000’s: a large, generally privatisation related investment 
might raise the share of a country (Poland: France; Czech Republic: Netherlands), or 
of a sector (e.g. telecommunications in each country).  This indicates the heavier 
concentration of investments in the other three countries. 
The share of the manufacturing varies, representing less than half of the total 
stock in each country at present.  This is also affected considerably by the progress of 
privatisation and the policy relating to greenfield investments, and also the price 
achieved in the privatisation sale of firms in various sectors.  For instance, the share 
of financial services is larger in the other three countries because of the large bank 
privatisation transactions occurring later than in Hungary.  The same holds true for 
the telecommunications sector.  In the Czech Republic, the high-value privatisations 
in the service sector have pushed the share of the manufacturing industries below 
30%. 
Within manufacturing, outward-processing-intensive light industry sectors 
(textile, leather) have attracted minimal foreign investment in the period under 
review, that is, foreign firms prefer to exploit the labour which is much cheaper than 
in their home countries under contract manufacturing arrangements.  In case of 
Hungary, the share of cokeg, petroleum processing, chemical industry is outstandingly 
high – primarily due to the privatisation of MOL.  (Similar changes are to be 
expected in the Czech Republic because of the Transgas privatisation.)  Because of 
the inherited industrial structure, the production of non-metal mineral products is 
relatively high in the Czech Republic and Poland, and metalworking in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia.  The motor vehicle industry, and in particular the motorcar 
industry, is one of the main targets of foreign investors in the region, this sector 
having a large share in each country.  This is attributable to the low labour cost in 
case of export-oriented production, or (mostly in Poland) by access to a protected 
market.  The role of the latter consideration has been diminished in line with 
liberalisation towards the EU.  In contrast, the share of investments in the electronics 
sector was outstandingly high in Hungary within the FDI stock of 2000.  (This is not 
likely to be changed substantially by the exit of IBM either.) 
The structure of the Hungarian FDI stock is probably somewhat different from 
that in the other countries of the region in two other respects as well.  According to 
our own estimates (Antalóczy, Sass, 2003b), the share of greenfield projects in the 
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whole stock is the highest in Poland and Hungary (between 1/3 and ¼ in case of 
Hungary, and somewhat higher in Poland).  The share of export oriented projects 
(ibid.) may be the highest in Hungary at around 15-20%, the ratio being below 15% in 
the other countries of the region. 
What are the factors behind the relative positions of the various countries in 
attracting capital into the region?  Do incentives play a part in the FDI inflow? 
In 1989 Hungary was the first country to open up its economy to foreign direct 
investment.  Being the first in the region in this respect certainly gave the advantage 
of early start, especially as many large foreign firms were poised to enter the region.14  
From the early nineties Hungary and Poland offered considerable incentives to 
foreign investors in the region.  However, in case of Poland (due to the deeper 
recession and the debt problems), the negative investment environment could for a 
long time not be offset by the incentives, despite the much larger domestic market, 
while Hungary was also the first to involve foreigners in privatisation (Kalotay, 
Hunya 2000).  After a brief period in the early nineties, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia did not offer any incentives, and the peculiar technique of privatisation 
practically excluded foreigners from the privatisation process.  In these two countries 
the opening of the market to foreign investors was not clear, just as there were 
restrictive periods in Poland as well.  In Hungary a special regulation also played a 
significant role in attracting capital: that of industrial custom free zones, which had a 
major role in attracting export oriented greenfield projects mostly from the mid-
nineties. (Antalóczy, Sass 2000)15 
Even though these countries chose different roads, by the mid-to-late eighties 
each country had gone through the most difficult stage of transition, and they 
became increasingly similar in terms of their characteristics.  This is especially true 
for Hungary and the Czech Republic in respect of market size, geographical location, 
human capital and infrastructure facilities.  After the clear opening towards FDI, at 
this stage the emphasis was shifted to indicators of the investment environment.  In 
the late nineties both the Czech Republic (1998) and Slovakia (2000) introduced 
considerable incentives.  It is difficult to assess the generosity of a system of 
incentives.  On the one hand, there have been relatively numerous changes and 
alterations in the incentive mix.  On the other hand, the package consists of several 
different incentives in each country.  According to Antalóczy, Sass (2003b), 
companies concerned think that tax allowances16 and the regulation of industrial 
customs free zones were the most important incentives in Hungary.  Therefore we 
shall try to compare incentive systems of the region focusing on these two incentives.  
                                                 
14 As one important consequence of the early start, the presence of renowned investors and the high 
FDI stock in themselves acted as attractions for investors. 
15 It can be hardly assumed that the FDI policies of Hungary (and the other countries reviewed) would 
have been part of a conscious economic development strategy.  Instead, they were influenced or 
determined by short term economic pressures (such as the size of the debt in case of Hungary) or 
political decisions. 
16 According to Smart Hungary, the key element of the Hungarian incentive system after the second 
half of the nineties was the tax allowance for large investments:  close to four fifths of the support to 
the processing industry reached the companies through this instrument.  
(www.gkm.hu/site/fomenu/gazdasag/smart_hungary_021016.html) 
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The generosity of tax incentives can be compared based on the minimum investment 
size and the general tax rate. 
Table 4 Minimum investment sizes in the Visegrád countries (2002) 
 Czech Republic Poland Hungary Slovakia 
Corporate 
income tax 
rate (2002) 
31% 26% 18% 25% 
Minimum 
investment 
size 
approx. EUR 10 
million (or approx. 
EUR 5 million in 
less developed 
regions) 
EUR 100 thousand 
(in case of 
investments before 
2001, EUR 2 
million) 
approx. EUR 20 
million (or approx. 
EUR 12 million in 
less developed 
regions) 
from EUR 1.5 million 
to EUR 5 million 
(depending on the 
sector, activity and 
the unemployment 
rate in the host 
region) 
 
In terms of minimum investment size, in 2001 the Hungarian rules were the 
tightest, while the corporate income tax rate was the lowest.  That is, the relative 
value of tax exemption is the lowest here, and eligibility is the most difficult to 
obtain.  On the other hand, Hungary has the lowest income tax rate, which is an 
important element in the general investment environment.  In Poland, on the other 
hand, practically every foreign investment is eligible for benefit.  (Since 2001, 
however, only investors in the 15 special economic zones have been eligible.) 
The regulation of Hungarian industrial custom free zones has been really 
beneficial mostly for export-oriented, assembling companies.  The other countries 
covered in the study have no similar regulations.  The Polish special economic zones 
are in the custom territory.  The establishment and development of Czech and Slovak 
industrial parks started only after 2000, but their role has been rather limited.  Even 
though custom free zones exist in the other countries as well, they are trade-related 
and operated based on the classic custom free zone principles.  (Antalóczy, Sass, 
2000). 
Even though there are no calculations available for any of the countries about 
the role of the various factors (including incentives) in attracting capital, it appears 
likely from the empirical literature that in the late nineties – early in this century the 
countries of the region have become increasingly similar for investment purposes.  
This is especially true for Hungary and the Czech Republic, which are very similar in 
terms of market size, infrastructure facilities and economic performance.  Because of 
the relative saturation of Hungary (the saturation of the most popular target regions), 
its fallback in the regional incentive race, the absence of adequately qualified labour, 
then in 2002-03 the worsening economic indicators resulting from the economic 
policy of the government, some large and important projects were implemented in 
the Czech Republic or Slovakia.  As another major factor in Hungary’s fallback, in the 
other three countries large privatisation transactions were left for the late nineties or 
the beginning of this decade. 
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Investment incentives in the Czech Republic 
In the Czech Republic an incentive package with considerable benefits was introduced in 
May 1998.  The institutional background of investment promotion was also created:  
Czechinvest has been granted considerable independence and operates as a kind of one-stop-
shop.  The agency arranges and efficiently implements practically all the tasks relating to the 
investment, often pro-actively approaching investors, and their experiences appear to be 
utilised when rules are amended.  Czech benefits are similar to those in Hungary (similar size 
and eligibility criteria).  There are four important differences: the incentives accepted by the 
EU were taken into consideration already in 1998, and later the Czech system was further 
approximated to the EU requirements (e.g. education and training, public assistance to 
environmental projects).  Secondly, the investment threshold for eligibility for tax and other 
incentives was much lower than in Hungary.17  Thirdly, even though they attempted to 
establish a system of industrial parks, they did not introduce regulations similar to those 
governing Hungarian industrial custom free zones.  Fourthly, in the Czech Republic the 
incentives granted by local governments are more effectively co-ordinated with central 
incentives.  There is another recent and important difference:  Czechinvest has had a major 
role in the introduction of two new incentive schemes in June 2002: the framework 
programmes to promote strategic services and the foundation and expansion of technology 
centres.  (Under these programmes, the government covers part of the labour or capital costs 
(not more than half), and 60 and 35% of the costs of training and retraining, respectively – 
also with an eye to EU compatibility.) 
 
Competitiveness and FDI:  findings of the empirical literature 
Relatively few studies have looked at the relationship of growth and FDI in 
the transition countries, or the presence of FDI spillovers.  Table 5 below summarises 
the findings of some recent studies, in particular those that look at the role of FDI in 
regional comparison. 
Table 5 Examination of the effects of FDI on the host economy in the empirical 
literature 
Author, year Subject, purpose of study Method Key findings 
Éltető (1999) FDI and foreign 
trade 
Sectoral and 
aggregate 
country data 
1994-1996 
Established probability that the role of firms 
with foreign participation is decisive in the 
development of foreign trade in the four small 
transition economies 
Kinoshita 
(2000) 
Presence of R&D 
and technological 
spillovers in the 
Czech Republic 
Corporate 
level data 
1995-1998 
In the Czech Republic:  indirect R&D effect 
through the growth of absorption capacity on 
productivity, the technological spillover varies 
significantly by sector, being sizable in the 
l d d d /
                                                 
17 According to the figures of Czechinvest, 41 firms were granted tax exemption or tax allowances to 
their investments between January 2000 and July 2001; in the Hungarian system, only seven of these 
would have been eligible. 
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electronic industry and radio/TV 
manufacturing; no technological spillover 
found in joint ventures 
Knell (2000) Presence of FDI 
related externalities 
Corporate 
data 
No externalities improving the efficiency of 
domestic firms in the transition countries 
Landesmann, 
Stehrer (2000) 
Foreign trade 
competitiveness 
and FDI 
Foreign trade 
data 
The competitiveness of the processing industry 
improved the most in the transition countries 
with the greatest role of firms with foreign 
participation 
Bosco (2001) FDI, technological 
spillovers and 
growth 
Corporate 
data 1993-
1997 
The strongest FDI related impact is on 
competition, no spillover; the performance of 
foreign owned companies exceeding that of 
domestic firms in Hungary 
Damijan et al. 
(2001) 
FDI related 
spillover effects 
Corporate 
panel data 
No definitive sign of spillovers in eight 
transition countries 
Hamar (2001) Performance of 
domestic and 
foreign-owned 
companies 
Corporate 
data 
Duality in the Hungarian economy: different 
performance of, and minimal links between, 
firms with Hungarian and foreign owners 
Hamar, 
Nagy (2001) 
Relationship of the 
product structure of 
export and 
ownership 
categories (inter 
alia) 
Corporate 
data 1996-
1999 
The overwhelming majority of Hungary’s 
export growth is attributable to foreign owned 
firms, the export growth of the machine 
industry being the highest 
Havlik et al. 
(2001) 
FDI and export Corporate 
data 
Relationship between the competitiveness of 
the processing industry and FDI, FDI is 
responsible for the increase of technology 
intensive exports in some transition countries 
Pitti (2001) Performance of 
companies with 
domestic and 
foreign ownership 
Corporate 
data 
The performance of foreign owned companies 
is better, but the alignment of domestic firms 
started in Hungary 
UN ECE 
(2001) 
Export and FDI Country data 
1993-1999 
The correlation of export growth and 
cumulative FDI inflow over GDP at PPP is 
significant and positive in transition countries, 
especially in the most developed ones 
Vince (2001) Corporate linkages Corporate 
interviews 
In Hungary corporate linkages are strongly 
related to their ownership structure, there are 
two sub-groups within the group of foreign 
owned firms, with significantly different links 
to the domestic economy 
Campos, 
Kinoshita 
(2002) 
FDI and growth Aggregate 
country data 
The impact of FDI is positive and significant on 
growth in transition countries 
Hunya (2002) FDI and growth Aggregate 
country data, 
1995-2001 
In accession countries the restructuring of the 
processing industry is heavily dependent on 
FDI inflows, advantage of foreign owned firms 
d f d
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over domestic peers in terms of productivity, 
export, investments and profitability, duality in 
the various economies.  Technology transfer 
exists spillovers do not. 
Novák (2002) Efficiency increase 
and foreign 
ownership 
Corporate 
data 
In Hungary the foreign owned firms are more 
efficient, but the difference is diminishing 
 
Consequently, there is no consensus in the empirical literature concerning the 
impacts of FDI on the host economy.  Several studies agree on the relationship of FDI 
and economic growth, and FDI and changes in the foreign trade structure.  On the 
other hand, findings are controversial in respect of the presence of technology 
transfer and spillovers.  In this field one of the studies considers the competitive 
effect to be the most important.  In respect of linkages with the host economy, the 
literature discusses their changes over time and their strong correlation with the type 
of investment.  A number of authors point to the emergence of a kind of duality in 
the Hungarian economy, where foreign owned firms perform better than their 
Hungarian peers, while the most recent studies report the diminishing of that 
duality.  The tenets of general theory and empiricism are confirmed by the 
conclusions applicable to transition countries, among them Hungary: FDI does not 
automatically improve competitiveness and increase GDP, and technology transfer 
and spillovers do not happen automatically either.  Generally there are few links 
with the firms of the host economy (though they become more numerous over time). 
4.  The future –Possibilities for economic policy 
Foreign direct investment may improve the performance of the host economy 
in several ways.  However, these beneficial effects do not manifest themselves 
automatically.  Until the mid-nineties Hungary played a leading role in the region in 
attracting capital.  After 1999, however, it started accumulating disadvantages 
compared to its key competitors.  On the other hand, according to stock data 
adjusted for reinvested profits, the arrearage is not that substantial, but the post-1999 
figures indicate a gradual deterioration.  The past two years saw several companies 
exit, while we were defeated by the Czech Republic or Slovakia in the competition 
for some major investment projects.  The global drop in FDI appears to affect only 
Hungary within the region to any significant extent, while inward FDI has not 
declined in the other Visegrád countries. 
The positive economic impacts of the investments already here have also 
fallen short of expectations.  In effect, the competition generated by foreign-owned 
firms had a major effect on the economic processes of Hungary, and foreign-owned 
firms also played a significant part in the restructuring of the economy.  However, 
foreign-owned firms have established few linkages with domestic companies, even 
though the numbers have been growing over time. 
What can we do to assure that inflow of direct investment resumes the level 
before the setback, and that existing investments exert greater positive impacts on the 
host economy? 
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Changes are difficult to make in the short term18 , but one or two major 
investment projects would certainly have significant “demonstrative” effects and 
positive publicity.  Keeping an eye on EU accession next year, we may utilise the 
maximum aid intensity and other possible benefits.  We could rely on the labour 
force left behind by the firms that exited and the existing infrastructure at their sites 
when “enticing” one or two larger projects.  The incorporation of reinvested profits 
into the FDI figures would also be conducive to restoring our reputation; this would 
make it clear even for persons not familiar with methodological issues that the 
decline in inward investment is not that substantial.19  (Cf. methodological note at the 
end of the first chapter) 
1.  In the longer term the most important means of attracting investment is to 
improve the general investment environment.  This should certainly be defined as 
part of a consistent, long term economic development strategy, which gives a major 
role/priority to attracting capital and the more efficient utilisation of the positive 
effects of existing investments.  In this respect co-ordination between the various 
elements of economic policy is important, so that other economic policy elements do 
not work against the objectives of investment promotion.  As we have seen, the 
position of the economy and the quality of the general investment environment are 
decisive from the aspect of attracting capital.  We have room for improvement in this 
area as well (even compared to our key competitors).  The “sorting out” of certain 
economic policy areas may yield positive results,20 but it would be more efficient to 
design the various policies based on a long term, consistent concept.  The positive 
impacts of the measures take time to emerge; immediate results should not be 
expected. 
2. In order to improve our ability to attract capital, it would be important to 
improve the general investment environment on the regulatory side by eliminating 
macro-economic imbalances, increasing the predictability of economic policy and 
developing the intermediating financial sector. 
From among the elements of the economic environment that promote the 
payoff of investments, improvement of the following elements is the most important.  
Firstly, the infrastructure with appropriate structure (physical, technological, 
transport-forwarding, telecommunication, information technologies) plays a major 
                                                 
18  As one important reason, 2-3 years may elapse between a corporate decision and the 
implementation of a project. 
19 In this respect it may be expedient to use the Polish “method”. 
20 Even though, according to the literature, exchange rate fluctuations do not have significant effects 
on foreign direct investments, empirical data indicate the contrary.  According to Feenstra (1998), 
experience shows that M+A-related FDI is sensitive to interest rate changes.  He quotes Froot and 
Stein (1991), who claim on the basis of the US example that exchange rate changes affect new 
investments as well (i.e., the strengthening of the currency results in the decrease of equity-type 
inflows).  According to Bloningen (1997), as in case of foreign direct investment the currency of 
investment and the currency of the profit or transfer revenue is different for the parent company, the 
exchange rate of the two currencies concerned certainly affect the investment decision.  In Hungary, 
investment is becoming more expensive; furthermore, the revaluation reinforces the impacts of the 
wage increase (detrimental for resource oriented investors).  For Hungary, the regional developments 
in this area are especially important.  And yet another aspect in the context of recent events:  
haphazard, inconsistent exchange rate (and economic) policy deters investors. 
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role, and so does education (education, training, vocational training, labour force in 
an appropriate qualification structure).  The current structure should be 
approximated to a structure of qualifications appropriate for the present level of 
development of the economy: for the attraction of investments, one of the key 
problems is the absence of labour force with medium-level qualifications, and the 
departure of the training structure of higher education from the desired structure. 
The significance of these two areas of education-training and infrastructure is 
heightened by the fact that they would promote not only new investments but also 
the reinvestment of profits; furthermore, they reinforce each other’s impacts, and 
promote not only the attraction of capital but also the integration of capital into the 
host economy, and aid to these areas is not against the EU rules; indeed, EU co-
financing is also available for these fields.  (In the EU the manoeuvring room of 
economic policy in respect of aid will be more restricted than before the accession but 
it will stay relatively broad:  certain preferences of Member States can be reflected.  
For instance, in a number of EU Member States there are one or two priority areas 
where investments receive benefits:  for instance, certain high technology sectors in 
Austria and Belgium.) 
3.  In respect of investment promotion in the narrow sense, EU membership 
will significantly change its system of conditions (and that of economic policy in 
general).  For investment incentives in Hungary it is an important change that the 
emphasis may be shifted to financial incentives21 and the role of fiscal incentives may 
be diminished.  Other incentives, such as infrastructure development, may increase 
in value.  Membership will also have a very important positive yield: because of EU 
regulations, the differences in investment incentives will be smaller between 
Hungary its major competitors and the regional incentive competition will be 
stopped.  (On the other hand, an important Hungarian instrument in attracting 
capital will be lost:  the customs free zone regulation.) 
Under EU rules, significant assistance can be provided to the least developed 
areas.  At present the whole of Hungary is considered less developed for purposes of 
regional policy.  Improving the capacity of potential investment sites to attract capital 
(by infrastructure, training) is an important task, and EU funding is available for this.  
The entire system of incentives must be made EU compatible, and all the possible 
forms of assistance reflecting Hungarian preferences must be made available to 
firms.  (Table 9 discloses the available forms of aid in a simplified format.)  Forms of 
assistance are diverse. From the viewpoint of the EU it is compliance with the aid 
ceilings that is important. 
Considerable changes are called for in the institution system of investment 
promotion.  The experience of successful countries indicates that it is more 
appropriate to establish a single, more independent, proactive institution that 
concentrates only on investment promotion and has decision making powers.  That 
institution must have a co-ordination function in respect of the granting of benefits 
                                                 
21 This is not inevitable, though, as, according to the EU competition policy report, in some Member 
States fiscal instruments (tax exemption, tax allowance) were the most important forms of state aid in 
the late nineties (in Greece, France). 
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(today in Hungary too many institutions and organisations can award such benefits).  
The investment promotion entity must maintain continuous contact with the 
government, and its feedback must be utilised in the formulation and management 
of incentives.  It is important that the organisation proactively approaches potential 
investors instead of working only with investors who come to Hungary.  The 
activities of Czechinvest after 1998 (and its homepage!) offer an example in the 
region.  The reform of the system and making it public and available to foreigners as 
soon as possible is also important to reduce uncertainties. 
4. The limitation of the regional incentive competition will be beneficial as 
investment promotion is a double-edged knife.  It has a role in channelling 
investments at the regional level, and it may have some short term effects, but it may 
also have significant negative impacts.  It can be used efficiently mainly where 
market failures need to be corrected.  Though this is the case in a number of 
instances, the design of the intervention and the “correction” of market failure are 
difficult tasks, which do not always yield success.  In this respect a normative 
regulation may be more appropriate. 
In the field of investment promotion in the narrow sense it may be a serious 
dilemma whether, following in the wake of other Member States, Hungary should 
opt for targeted investment incentives, giving priority to one or two sectors based on 
the Irish experiences to exploit synergies and agglomeration effects, or to take the 
route chosen by the Czech Republic and introduce targeted benefits in the service 
sector, or perhaps to rely on the Asian experiences and continue preferring export 
oriented investments.  It is difficult to identify winning sectors, and even more 
difficult to create an environment favourable to them, beyond the benefits: e.g. 
adequately skilled labour, infrastructure.  All this presupposes efficient and co-
ordinated action on behalf of the central government (and local governments).  In 
case of targeted, so-called third generation investment incentives (Kalotay, 2003), the 
beneficiaries of incentive measures are not selected by the state; instead, they are 
chosen based on objective, publicly declared criteria.  Programmes containing 
targeted incentives are designed for a definite period of time.  Targeting may mean 
the priority treatment of certain sectors as well as preference for certain corporate 
functions, activities, firms focusing on certain geographical areas or incumbent 
investors.  That is, instead of case-by-case bargains, this is a transparent, normative 
system of incentives.  On the other hand, to assure appropriate and workable 
targeting, it is important to assess the availability of resources in the country and the 
position of infrastructure to support investments. 
The composition of the FDI stock would appear to suggest priority treatment 
to the electronics industry.  The sector, however, wrestles with severe problems, with 
significant capacity reductions all over the world, and investors clearly preferring 
Asia (in particular China).  Hungary has also been affected by the capacity reduction 
drive, and even though this sector potentially has significant agglomeration, R&D 
and spillover effects and potential for attracting additional capital, the promotion of 
investments into the electronics sector does not appear to be a good choice in the 
present situation.  (Economic recovery may create a new situation).  Hungarian 
capacities in the motor industry are not sizeable in regional comparison, even though 
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in terms of local added value we are ahead of Poland and Slovakia.  The established 
production phases in the motor industry are mostly labour intensive, with little scope 
for advancement, and the industry is also declining (also burdened with national 
economic policy priorities and the strict incentive regulations to be introduced in the 
EU in the near future).  It may be a problem in both sectors that most investments 
rely intensively on cheap, unskilled labour, and the advantage of Hungary in this 
area has largely disappeared.  From among traditional sectors, the pharmaceutical 
industry could be considered, but due to the intensifying global concentration of the 
industry and the importance of capital-intensive R&D activities it appears to be an 
improper choice.  Following the Czech example, the priority treatment of certain 
services (e.g. information technology, corporate services, corporate service centres to 
be relocated in Hungary) could also be an option.  This is less capital intensive, 
requires higher qualifications, and the incumbent similar projects may offer a 
positive example. 
In case of targeted investment incentives, their advantages and disadvantages 
should be compared.  As the most important advantage, targeted investment 
incentives allow us to concentrate the available resources on priority sectors.  
Furthermore, in this manner the government’s economic policy may play an active 
part in the formulation of the comparative advantages of the economy, “channelling” 
them in the desirable direction.  Thirdly, synergies and agglomeration effects may be 
amplified in the selected sectors.  However, the advantages are overshadowed by the 
disadvantages of targeted investment incentives in the present Hungarian situation.  
Firstly, there is considerable danger of rent-seeking and abuses.  Secondly, the 
identification of priority sectors is difficult, as illustrated above.  Thirdly: the cyclical 
sensitivity of the priority sectors may boost costs considerably in the short term.  
Fourthly, the range of effective targeted instruments that can be applied is 
significantly limited by our international commitments (WTO, EU).  Fifthly, the 
entire economic policy must be readjusted, the other economic policy elements must 
also promote the priority sectors, and economic strategy must also accord them 
priority.  Sixthly, it should be noted that even though there are some international 
examples for successful targeted sectoral incentives, there are much more cases 
where targeted incentives did not yield the desired results.  On the whole, a 
normative system can be more beneficial in the present economic situation.  On the 
other hand, the priority treatment of information technology should be considered, 
as it has additional benefits to the above in the form of enhanced synergies and 
agglomeration effects (affecting almost all the sectors); furthermore, the priority 
treatment of the sector may be justified under the premise that its underdevelopment 
may result in a permanent fallback. 
Could it be useful to provide different incentives to the various types of 
investment?  The Hungarian system introduced in the second half of the nineties 
favoured assembly-type, outward-processing or contract manufacturing-like, export 
oriented, greenfield investments.  In the case of those projects, our competitive 
advantage has been considerably eroded; furthermore, this type of investment has 
one of the most limited impacts on the host economy.  As privatisation targets peter 
out, there is minimal scope for promoting acquisition-type FDI.  On the whole:  there 
is no point in giving preference to any kind of investment type, normative being the 
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recommended solution in this case also.  On the other hand, due to the significant 
stock already in Hungary, the promotion of the reinvestment of profits can be a 
priority area. 
5.  According to the most recent theoretical and empirical literature, the 
general tax rate is one of the key factors for investment (by domestic or foreign 
investors alike).  Even though it may prompt severe resentment in the EU and its 
impact on tax revenues is questionable, the treatment of the corporate income tax 
rate as an instrument to attract capital (and investments in general) may be worth 
considering (see the Irish example).  Especially if our lag in the regional investment 
attraction race appears to grow, and Hungary receives a smaller-than-desired share 
of the investment reallocation triggered by the integration.  In respect of the current 
corporate income tax rate, Hungary is in a favourable position as compared to the 
accession countries of Central Eastern Europe and the EU Member States alike.  
There may be a slight move towards an even lower tax rate, but the manoeuvring 
room is rather limited.  It is constrained by the EU and OECD rules (“tax havens”).  
However, a 12-15 percent normative corporate income tax rate could have a 
demonstrative effect, and it may also induce firms to record as well as invest some of 
their profits in Hungary.  The corporate income tax reduction would have the 
additional benefit of being normative, transparent, advantageous also for domestic 
(small and medium sized) enterprises, represents a smaller drain on budget revenues 
than the reduction of other taxes, and, according to empirical studies, the profit tax 
plays an ever increasing role in site selection decisions. 
However, the most important factor in the reduction of the general tax burden 
is not the profit tax but the other taxes and contributions.  These include primarily 
social security contributions, personal income tax, the value added tax and local 
taxes.  These are rather high in regional and EU comparison, while their reduction 
could have a more sizable impact on budget revenues.  In case of local taxes, their 
reduction would require the reconsideration of the financing of local governments. 
The potentially selective acceleration of depreciation may also be useful in 
case of certain strategic activities, capital goods, information technology equipment 
etc.  In this respect fairly significant changes were introduced already in 2003. 
6.  As regards the (positive) impacts on the host economy and the potential 
tools of improving integration into the host economy: the trends of spillovers and 
technology transfer etc. are very difficult to influence with economic policy tools.  
The few international success stories should not overshadow the fact that in many 
countries the various PR’s yielded no or negligible results.  This area is also a part of 
investment promotion, and in this sense it must be subordinated to the same 
institution.  The integration of the incumbent investments into the economy should 
be considered at least as important as the attraction of new investments.  In this 
respect the government policy could focus on Hungarian subsidiaries of smaller 
multinational firms (Vince, 2001), which are potentially easier to integrate into the 
host economy – and therefore have more substantial spillover effects – than the 
domestic subsidiaries of large multinationals.  From among the types of state aid 
endorsed by the EU, the incentives to SME’s and to R&D activities should be 
designed so as to promote the stronger integration of foreign-owned enterprises into 
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the host economy.  In addition to the key instruments used in the supplier 
programmes (information provision, identification of potential suppliers, operation 
of a databank, establishment of supplier associations, organisation of meetings for 
suppliers etc.), it may be worth concentrating resources to strategic sectors in this 
case, because investors coming to Hungary perform selection in advance.  For 
foreign-owned firms working in the export-driven sectors with the highest FDI stock, 
a group of efficient (small and medium sized) suppliers could be established through 
normative, performance-linked state aids.  In this case, subsidised loans for capacity 
building may be justified. 
 
Investment incentives in Ireland 
In case of Ireland, the treatment of investment attraction as a priority was based on a 
national consensus in the eighties.  (An external factor should be highlighted in this context:  
the role of competition with the United Kingdom, which practically surrounds Ireland.)  In 
addition to other factors (relatively cheap and, as a result of the well-planned and EU-
supported education reform of the seventies, relatively highly qualified and English-speaking 
workforce, purposeful development of infrastructure with EU assistance, efficient and 
independent state economic development institution (IDA)), the Irish industrial policy played 
an important role in attracting capital.  The targeting of industrial policy was a key element 
of success (priority sectors: electronic and pharmaceutical industries, and the significant 
resulting agglomeration effects).  Also contributing to the success, Irish economic policy-
makers were, one way or the other, able to fray out one-off allowances/discretionary powers 
from Brussels almost continuously, and to apply for EU assistance with great efficiency.  Also 
importantly, they were also able to improve linkages between the newly established firms and 
the host economy, partly due to the aforementioned agglomeration effects (primarily through 
the provision of services, less by increasing the share of locally produced parts or 
components22).  Furthermore, the Irish economy was also successful in its timing:  the 
positive, investment-attracting effects of the establishment of the single internal market, the 
introduction of the common currency and the economic and monetary union were manifested 
most fully in this country.  From the eighties, the macro-economic policies resulting in 
equilibrium also played an important role in making the investment environment more 
attractive.  It should be noted, however, that the Irish industrial policy has considered the 
(permanently) low corporate income tax rate (12%) to be one of the key instruments in 
attracting investments (the maintenance of that low level has been condoned by the 
Commission (Brown, Raines, 2002)). 
 
                                                 
22 Even though they performed better than average in this respect as well:  e.g. in the electronic 
industry the ratio of local contribution is over 20%.  (Ruane, Görg, 2000). 
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Annex 
Table 6 Breakdown by investor country (% of total investment) 
 Czech 
Republic 
Poland Hungary Slovakia 
Germany 25.5 13.4 25.8 23.0 
Netherlands 30.1 8.6 22.5 20.9 
Austria 11.1 1.5 12.2 17.6 
US 6.5 14.7 8.2 6.0 
Belgium 4.8 n/a 3.9 2.3 
France 4.3 19.2 6.5 1.8 
Switzerland 4.0 n/a 2.1 n/a 
Italy n/a 6.6 2.7 10.7 
Japan n/a n/a 2.1 n/a 
UK 3.5 5.0 1.1 3.9 
Sweden 1.4 4.3 n/a n/a 
Czech 
Republic 
- n/a n/a 5.0 
Hungary n/a n/a - 3.8 
South Korea n/a 3.0 n/a n/a 
Russia n/a 2.4 n/a n/a 
Total 92.4 78.7+4.6* 89.8 95 
Other 7.6 16.7 10.2 5 
Of total, EU 87.7 68.2 80.2 81.3 
 
Source:  WIFO/WIIW.  Czech Republic, Hungary:  December 2000; Poland, Slovakia: 
December 2001; Czech Republic: all three FDI components; Hungary: ownership 
share; Poland: all three FDI components and projects in excess of USD 1 million; 
Slovakia: net of loans from owners; no data available about participations below 1%; 
*in case of Poland, investments in the “international” category represent 4.6%, 
constituting mostly international organisations (EBRD). 
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 Table 7 Sectoral breakdown of the FDI stock (%) 
 Czech Republic Poland Hungary Slovakia 
Agriculture, 
fisheries 
0.4 0.1 1.1 0.3 
Mining 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.7 
Manufacturing 29.2 41.2 36.8 43.8 
Electricity, gas, 
water 
5.3 2.8 9.4 0.2 
Construction 0.5 5.2 1.2 0.8 
Trade 11.9 11.4 12.4 10.5 
Catering 0.8 1.2 1.8 0.7 
Transp., 
telecomm. 
17.2 10.7 7.7 13.9 
Financial services 27.5 23.1 11.3 25.9 
Real estate 
services 
6.4 1.2 15.7 3.0 
Public utilities n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Education n/a n/a 0.0 n/a 
Health care n/a n/a 0.1 0.0 
Other services 0.4 3.1 1.9 0.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:  WIFO/WIIW.  Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia: December 2000; Estonia, 
Poland, Slovakia: December 2001; Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia: all three FDI 
components; Hungary:  Ownership share; Poland: all three FDI components and 
projects in excess of USD 1 million; Slovakia: net of loans from owners. 
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Table 8 Distribution of manufacturing investments (%) 
 Czech 
Republic 
Poland Hungary Slovakia 
Food, beverages, tobacco 12.5 22.5 14.1 27.8 
Textile, textile goods  3.5 1.1 2.0 n/a 
Leather goods, footwear 0.0 0.1 0.5 n/a 
Wood processing n/a 6.6 1.0 n/a 
Paper ind., publishing, printing 8.1 7.2 3.3 n/a 
Coking, crude oil proc, chemical ind.  6.7 27.7 14.4* 
Rubber and plastic 17.1 2.7 3.3 n/a 
Other non-metal mineral products 15.4 13.9 4.6 n/a 
Metal processing 9.5 2.3 3.6 21.6 
Machinery and equipment 8.6 1.9 3.7 n/a 
Electrical machinery and instruments 6.5 7.1 15.8 16.2 
Motor vehicles 17.1 23.7 19.9 16.2 
Other manufacturing 1.6 2.0 0.5 n/a 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:  Czech National Bank, Polish National Bank, CSO, Hosková (2001); Czech 
Republic, Hungary:  December 2000, Poland:  June 2002, Slovakia: 2000 (share of the 
four key sectors);  * Only chemical production 
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Table 9 Possible forms and rates of state aid in the EU 
Aid Scope of application Maximum aid intensity 
Regional sectors: 1. exceptions: agriculture, 
fisheries, coal mining. 2.special rules: 
transport, steel, shipbuilding, 
synthetic fibres, motor vehicles, large 
investment projects (the total aid is at 
least EUR 50 million or the total 
project cost is at least EUR 50 million 
and the aid intensity is at least 50% of 
the regional aid ceiling and aid per 
job created or safeguarded is at least 
EUR 40 000) 
regions: 1. GDP per capita is below 
75% of the EU average, or high 
unemployment rate; 2. regions 
deemed problematic based on the 
indicators proposed by the national 
governments. 
I. large investments: 
1. where GDP per capital is below 75% of the 
EU average: 
1.1. where GDP per capital is below 60% of 
the EU average: 50-65% 
1.2. higher than 60%: 40-50% 
2. problem regions as defined by national 
governments: 
2.1. standard: 20-30% 
2.2. prospering: 10-20% 
 
II. SME’s: 
the above + 15% (1.1. and 1.2.), or the above + 
10% (2.1. and 2.2.) 
Aid to small 
and medium 
sized 
enterprises 
(SME’s) 
small enterprise:  fewer than 50 
employees, annual turnover not 
exceeding EUR 7 million or annual 
balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 
5 million, conform to the criterion of 
independence; 
 
medium seized enterprise: fewer than 
250 employees, annual turnover not 
exceeding EUR 40 million or annual 
balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 
27 million, conform to the criterion of 
independence. 
investment: 
standard regions: small enterprises: 15%, 
medium sized enterprises: 7.5%; 
regions with per capita GDP below 75% of 
the EU average: the regional aid ceiling + 
15% (but may not exceed 75% net) 
problem regions identified by national 
governments: regional aid ceiling + 10% (but 
may not exceed 30% net) 
aid for services of outside consultants and 
participation in fairs: up to 50% in each type 
of region. 
aid to R&D 
activities 
aid to (corporate) research and 
development (public financing of 
R&D activities by public non-profit-
making higher education or research 
establishments do not qualify as state 
aid to be notified) 
fundamental research: 100%; 
industrial R&D: standard: 50%, SME: + 10%, 
in regions with per capita GDP below 75% of 
the EU average: +10%, in regions identified 
by national governments: +5%, in projects 
related to EU R&D programmes: +15%; for 
projects involving cross-border co-operation: 
+10% (max. 75%); 
 
- precompetitive development: standard: 
25%, + the increases under the above 
categories, but max. 50%. 
Environmental 
aid 
- investment aid to help SME’s meet 
EU environmental standards, 
- aid for investments in energy 
saving, renewable sources of energy 
and CHP (combined production of 
Maximum aid intensity: 
1. outside assisted regions: 
(a) only to SME’s: 15% of the investment 
necessary to meet mandatory EU standards 
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and CHP (combined production of 
electric power and heat) 
-aid for the rehabilitation of polluted 
industrial sites 
- aid to the relocation of firms for 
environmental reasons, 
- aid for consultancy services (in 
accordance with rules applicable to 
SME’s) (in other groups of aid: aid to 
environmental investments in the 
steel industry and agriculture, and 
aid to environmental R&D and 
training – under the appropriate 
sectors and activities) 
(b) investment to improve on mandatory 
Community standards and relocation of 
firms: 30% 
(c) investments in energy saving and CHP: 
40% 
(d) investments in renewable sources of 
energy: 40% 
(e) rehabilitation of polluted industrial sites 
100% + 15% of the cost of the work 
(b), (c) and (d): for SME’s +10% 
2. in assisted regions: (a) 15%, (b), (c) and (d) 
40%, or the regional aid ceiling + 10%, but 
max. 100%, (e) rehabilitation of polluted 
industrial sites: 100% + 15% of the cost of the 
work, (b), (c) and (d): for SME’s + 10% 
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